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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DAWN MARIE BALL, 




JEFFREY BEARD; MARRIROSA LAMAS; JILL SHEPLER; 
WENDY NICHOLAS; MR. SMITH; MS. HARTMAN; 
MR. FRONTZ; TROY EDWARDS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-00845) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. 
' 1915(e)(2)(B) and Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 2, 2010 
 
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR.,  Circuit Judges. 
 









Dawn Marie Ball appeals from the District Court=s order denying her motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  We will affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2008); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6. 
I. 
Ball, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 
against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and seven prison 
employees.  Ball alleges that she has been confined in the Restrictive Housing Unit 
(ARHU@) since April of 2007 and that she will be so confined until 2024.1  She further 
alleges that such confinement has caused her physical and mental condition to deteriorate 
such that, among other things, she has lost over 100 pounds and become malnourished, 
suffers from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and experiences migraines and nausea.  
She also complains that her confinement in the RHU has prevented her from visiting with 
or calling her family.  Finally, she alleges that defendants have denied her requests for 
transfer to a prison in another state, and she seeks such a transfer in addition to monetary 
damages. 
                                                 
1
In another filing in this case and in her filings in other cases, she alleges that she 
will be so confined until 2014, not 2024. 
 
 3 
Ball filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, again requesting transfer to an 
out-of-state prison.  The District Court denied the motion by order entered January 11, 




We begin by emphasizing our narrow focus on review.  The only specific 
injunctive relief Ball requested is transfer to an out-of-state prison.  She has not 
requested release from the RHU into the general population.  Nor has she requested that 
defendants take steps to remedy her alleged physical and mental conditions while in the 
RHU.  Thus, our narrow focus on review is her request for a prison transfer. 
                                                 
2
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of preliminary injunctive relief pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. ' 1292(a)(1).  The District Court=s January 11 order also denied without 
prejudice Ball=s motion for the appointment of counsel.  Our jurisdiction does not extend 
to that portion of the order.  See Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984). 
We review the ultimate denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, though 
we exercise plenary review over any legal conclusion on which the District Court relied.  
See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying that request.  A 
preliminary injunction is an Aextraordinary remedy,@ and the party seeking it must show:  
A(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the 
injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater 
harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.@  Kos, 
369 F.3d at 708.  The District Court concluded that Ball failed to establish the first two 
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elements.  Because we agree that Ball has not shown a likelihood of obtaining a prison 
transfer, we will affirm. 
As the District Court explained, Ball has no entitlement to incarceration in any 
particular prison, let alone one outside Pennsylvania.  AJust as an inmate has no 
justifiable expectation that [s]he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a 
State, [s]he has no justifiable expectation that [s]he will be incarcerated in any particular 
State.@  Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983).  Ball has alleged nothing that 
might make the denial of her request for a prison transfer actionable under the 
circumstances presented here, and we will affirm on that basis. 
In light of the pendency of proceedings below and certain aspects of the District 
Court=s analysis, however, some additional observations are in order.  Although we do 
not decide the issue, Ball=s allegations that her physical and mental condition has 
drastically deteriorated while in the RHU potentially state a claim of deliberate 
indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  See, 
e.g., Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).  She expressly argued as much 
in her preliminary injunction brief, though she sought no relief other than a prison transfer 
and requested no specific relief in that regard in her complaint.
3
 
                                                 
3
In the separate action currently pending at Ball v. Famiglio, M.D. Pa. Civ. 
No. 08-cv-00700, Ball expressly complains of her medical treatment and seeks relief in 




Perhaps for that reason, the District Court noted Ball=s allegations about her health 
but did not address any potential Eighth Amendment claim.  Instead, it appears to have 
concluded that those allegations do not entitle Ball to relief because she does not have a 
protected liberty interest in freedom from confinement in the RHU.  (Dist. Ct. Mem. at 
6.)  Whether Ball has such a liberty interest would be relevant to a claim that she was 
deprived of that interest without due process.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 
531 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 471 (1995)).
4
 
Due process and Eighth Amendment claims, however, are distinct.  See, e.g., 
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-09 (3d Cir. 1997).  Whether Ball has a liberty 
interest in avoiding confinement in the RHU does not control the question of whether 
defendants have been deliberately indifferent to her medical needs while confining her 
there.  Given the potential seriousness of Ball=s allegations about her deteriorating health, 
we trust that the District Court will carefully consider that issue if and when appropriate. 
Accordingly, we will affirm.  Ball=s motion for the appointment of counsel on 
appeal is denied. 
 
                                                 
4
Ball has not expressly raised such a claim.  The District Court wrote that ABall 
never argues that she is wrongfully confined in the RHU.@  (Dist. Ct. Mem. at 6.)  It is 
true that Ball does not so allege in her complaint, but she argued in her preliminary 
injunction brief, without further elaboration, that the disciplinary charges that led to her 
confinement in the RHU were Atrumped up.@  We leave it for the District Court to decide 
whether to construe Ball=s complaint as asserting a due process claim and whether any 
deficiency in that regard could be cured by amendment. 
